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SOME TOUGH QUESTIONS FOR CHALLENGES TO
PREEMPLOYMENT DRUG TESTING
Stefan Jan Marculewicz*
In response to widespread illegal drug use in the United States, on Sep-
tember 15, 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order No.
12,564, which outlined what has become the current policy on drug use by
employees of the federal government.' President Reagan ordered all ex-
ecutive agencies of the federal government to implement programs to test
employees and employment applicants for the use of illegal drugs.2 The
federal agencies complied by implementing testing programs for their
own employees,3 as well as for employees in regulated industries. State
* The author is a 1993 graduate of the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University
of America, Washington, D.C.
1. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986).
2. Id. President Reagan's Order set guidelines for a comprehensive drug testing pol-
icy for federal government employees. Of particular importance is § 3 of the Order, which
sets forth the following guidelines for drug testing programs:
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program to test for the
use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions. The extent to which such
employees are tested and the criteria for such testing shall be determined by the
head of each agency, based upon the nature of the agency's mission and its em-
ployees' duties, the efficient use of agency resources, and the danger to the public
health and safety or national security that could result from the failure of an em-
ployee adequately to discharge his or her position.
(b) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program for voluntary
employee drug testing.
(c) In addition to the testing authorized in subsections (a) and (b) of this section,
the head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee for illegal
drug use under the following circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses illegal
drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident or un-
safe practice; or
(3) As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or rehabilitation for illegal drug
use through an Employee Assistance Program.
(d) The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test any applicant for ille-
gal drug use.
Id. at 32,890 (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., PERSONNEL MANUAL 5792-93 (1988) (Drug Free
Workplace Plan testing for drugs in six categories of employees); Dep't of Just. Drug-Free
244 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:243
and local governments also reacted to the drug problem by instituting
their own testing programs.5 A flurry of litigation ensued when govern-
ment employees and organizations representing their interests challenged
the constitutionality of the testing programs. In 1989, the Supreme Court
attempted to resolve the constitutional issues raised by parties challeng-
ing government-mandated drug testing. In National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab6 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'nZ the
Court provided some guidance for implementation of testing programs.
Uncertainty remains, however, and litigation over the issues continues.
One area where courts have essentially resolved the constitutional im-
plications of drug testing is preemployment testing. On July 6, 1992, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in American
Postal Workers Union v. Frank' that a labor union lacked standing to seek
an injunction against preemployment drug testing, where members of the
union, who by definition were already employees of the Postal Service,
did not risk exposure to such testing.9 Analyzed alone, the decision is not
surprising. 10 In the context of other preemployment testing challenges by
employees and prospective employees, however, the complex implica-
tions of this case are apparent. The American Postal Workers Union v.
Frank decision removes one of the few remaining means for job appli-
cants to protect their constitutional rights in the context of employment
drug testing.
This Comment provides a detailed analysis of the available challenges
to preemployment drug testing. Section I examines employment drug
testing programs in the context of American Postal Workers Union v.
Frank. Section II discusses the constitutional issues associated with
Workplace Plan (as amended Dec. 17, 1987) (testing five categories of employees working
in "sensitive positions").
4. See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 16.201 (1992) (Coast Guard requirements for testing private
employees aboard commercial vessels); 49 C.F.R. §§ 39.81-39.123 (1992) (U.S. Dep't
Transp. requirements for testing commercial vehicle operators).
5. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-20-110 to -112 (1990) (codifying the Georgia Ap-
plicant Screening Act); see also Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 595
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (describing the New York City Transit Authority's comprehensive drug
testing program).
6. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
7. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
8. 968 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 1377.
10. The court decided the case using a straightforward analysis of standing require-
ments for injunctive relief without "frills" or controversial conclusions of law. Id. at 1376-
78.
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mandatory drug testing. Section III discusses remedies available for par-
ties who prevail against preemployment drug testing programs, and the
effect of the First Circuit's holding in American Postal Workers Union v.
Frank on such remedies. Finally, Section IV analyzes the implications of
American Postal Workers Union v. Frank on the general ability to chal-
lenge drug testing. This Comment concludes that although grounds exist
to challenge preemployment drug testing, the holding in American Postal
Workers Union v. Frank limits challenges against the potentially unrea-
sonable intrusion of preemployment drug testing.
I. THE POSTAL SERVICE TESTING PROGRAM
AS A SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY
The United States Postal Service (USPS) and other government agen-
cies screened job applicants for drugs long before President Reagan is-
sued the 1986 Executive Order." The USPS first tested applicants for
employment for the presence of illegal drugs in a Boston post office on
September 24, 1986.12 The USPS implemented the testing as part of a
controversial research program on the job performance of employees
who use drugs.' 3 Although the results were touted as revolutionary,' 4 the
11. See One in Five Agencies Will Test For Drugs, House Study Finds, 24 Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 898 (June 30, 1986) (discussing the findings of a House of Representa-
tives study on the issue of agency drug testing programs).
The USPS has tested for indicators of disease through a program of urinalysis since 1981.
Job Performance Study Drug Tests Were Unconstitutional, Judge Rules, 27 Gov't Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 1582 (Dec. 11, 1989). In addition, although the USPS had no national policy
of testing applicants for drugs until 1987, the USPS had been conducting drug testing of job
applicants on a regional level for several years before the issuance of Executive Order No.
12,564. See, e.g., Some Federal Agencies Given Broad New Powers to Screen Employees For
Suspected Drug Use, 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 615 (Apr. 29, 1985); Matthew J.
Doherty, Drug Tests By Employers Are on the Rise, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 27. 1986, at L1.
12. See Craig Zwerling et al., The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for Mari-
juana and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Efficacy of Screening].
13. Id.; see also Applicants Who Test Positive for Illicit Drugs Likely to Have More Job
Trouble if Hired, Study Says, 28 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1487 (Dec. 3, 1990) [herein-
after Applicants]; Greg Rushford, Postal Service Hires and Watches Drug Users: More
Lines at the Post Office, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 1988, at 1. The USPS conducted the study
between September 24, 1986 and January 6, 1989. Efficacy of Screening, supra note 12, at
2639. The program did not mandate testing for the traditional reason for identifying illegal
drug users, which is to weed out drug abusers. See, e.g., National reasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (evaluating a Customs Service program that
makes final selection for a sensitive position contingent upon passing a drug test); Willner
v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (validating a Department of Justice testing
program that denies an applicant a position as an attorney if he or she tests positive for
drugs); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (consider-
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American Postal Workers Union (Union) challenged the program in
court and obtained an injunction to stop the research testing.' 5
Although the USPS ceased testing for research purposes, it continued
to screen applicants for drug use. The Union again brought suit before
the same court to enjoin the applicant testing program; 16 however, the
suit's outcome did not mirror the court's earlier decision. In a short
memorandum, the district court denied the Union's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction on two grounds, 7 the first of which was standing. 8
Although the same judge had granted the Union standing-to challenge
preemployment testing for research purposes in the earlier case, he ques-
tioned whether the Union had standing to challenge the testing policy
where testing was conducted for purposes other than research.19 His
analysis was based on a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) deci-
sion concluding that the national branch of the American Postal Workers
Union had waived its right to collective bargaining on the issue of preem-
ployment drug testing.2" The court reasoned that because drug testing
was not subject to a collective bargaining agreement, the Union could not
act in its representative capacity to challenge the drug testing policy un-
ing the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that disqualified applicants for employment in
the public school system based on a positive drug test).
The USPS did not reject applications of employees who tested positive for drugs. Postal
Service, McCloskey Spar Over Preemployment Research Program, 25 Gov't Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 1483 (Oct. 26, 1987) (reporting that applicants who tested positive for mari-
juana and cocaine were accepted for employment unless eliminated by other factors, such
as having a poor work history or a criminal record). Rather, the program was designed to
determine the effects of drug use on employee performance. Efficacy of Screening, supra
note 12, at 2639.
14. The research was claimed to be one of the first legitimate studies on the effects of
drug use on job performance. Efficacy of Screening, supra note 12, at 2642. The research-
ers concluded that previous estimates of the adverse effect of drug use in the workplace
were somewhat exaggerated. Id. at 2643. When compared to non-drug users, the study
"found that those with marijuana-positive urine samples have 55% more industrial acci-
dents, 85% more injuries, and a 78% increase in absenteeism. For those with cocaine-
positive urine samples, there was a 145% increase in absenteeism and an 85% increase in
injuries." Id. The researchers suggested that their findings could apply to a re-evaluation
of the cost-effectiveness of preemployment drug testing programs, as well as to the evalua-
tion of employee assistance programs. Id.
15. See American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989); see
also Applicants, supra note 13, at 1487.
16. American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 734 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1990).
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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less union members were directly affected by it.21 The court concluded
that because job applicants were not members of the Union, direct con-
frontation by union members was lacking, and thus it was doubtful that
the Union had standing to challenge the drug testing policy.22
The second ground advanced by the court to deny the Union's motion
for a preliminary injunction was one of the four factors traditionally con-
sidered for such emergency relief.23 The court concluded that the Union
had failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits on its
Fourth Amendment challenge.24 The court weighed the privacy interests
of the individual applicants against the interest of the USPS in maintain-
ing a drug-free workplace,25 and denied the Union injunctive relief on the
basis that testing applicants for drugs constituted a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.26
The Union appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.27 The court of appeals vacated the district court's decision
and remanded the case without reaching the substantive Fourth Amend-
ment issues. The court of appeals quietly criticized the lower court for
reaching the merits of the case,' and proceeded to complete the lower
court's standing analysis.29 The First Circuit held that the Union lacked
standing to seek an injunction against the USPS to stop preemployment
drug testing because members of the Union did not face a realistic risk of
future exposure to the testing.30
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In the First Circuit, a plaintiff must satisfy four criteria in order to be entitled
to a preliminary injunction. The court must find: 1) that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted; 2) that such injury outweighs any harm which grant-
ing injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; 3) that the plaintiff has exhibited a
likelihood of success on the merits; and 4) that the public interest will not be adversely
affected by granting the injunction. Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bel-
lotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981).
24. Frank, 734 F. Supp. at 41 (citing Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti,
641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981)).
25. See discussion infra part II.B.2. (discussing Supreme Court's balancing test applied
to Fourth Amendment challenges to drug testing).
26. American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d at 1374 (summarizing the
lower court's holding).
27. Id.
28. Id. The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that "[a]lthough the [district] court
referred to 'a problem with standing,' it nevertheless reached the merits to conclude that
the balance of interests weighed in favor of the Postal Service's need to exclude drug-using
individuals from employment." Id.
29. Id. at 1378.
30. Id. at 1376.
19941
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A comparison between the First Circuit's decision that applied to un-
ions and existing legal theories that allow challenges to mandatory pre-
employment drug testing by employment applicants reveals there is little
chance for an applicant to overcome testing as a condition of employ-
ment. Constitutional challenges to preemployment drug testing are diffi-
cult, and even should a party succeed with such a challenge, the remedies
available are so negligible that the wisdom of such a challenge is suspect.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY
PREEMPLOYMENT DRUG TESTING
A. Drug Testing: A Brief Description
Urinalysis is the most cost-effective and least intrusive method avail-
able to determine if an employee uses drugs.31 The procedure for con-
ducting a urinalysis test is simple. An employer obtains a urine sample
from an employee or an applicant for employment by requiring the indi-
vidual to urinate into a specimen container during a physical examination
or a drug testing session.32 The specimen is sent to a laboratory and ana-
31. Anne M. Rector, Comment, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace:
A Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1012
(1986). The author notes that other methods available "include polygraphs, employment
applications, questions about criminal convictions and present drug use, employee surveil-
lance, searches, interrogation, [and] blood testing." Id.
32. Courts have described in detail methods of taking urine samples for drug testing
purposes:
On reporting for the test, the employee must produce photographic identification
and remove any outer garments, such as a coat or a jacket, and personal belong-
ings. The employee may produce the sample behind a partition, or in the privacy
of a bathroom stall if he so chooses. To ensure against adulteration of the speci-
men, or substitution of a sample from another person, a monitor of the same sex
as the employee remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urina-
tion. Dye is added to the toilet water to prevent the employee from using the
water to adulterate the sample.
Upon receiving the specimen, the monitor inspects it to ensure its proper tem-
perature and color, places a tamper-proof custody seal over the container, and
affixes an identification label indicating the date and the individual's specimen
number.... [T]he urine sample is placed in a plastic bag, sealed, and submitted to
a laboratory.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 661 (1989) (describing the
method used by the U.S. Customs Service). The procedure for taking urine samples of
federal employees or applicants has been standardized somewhat by regulations promul-
gated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under Congressional man-
date. See 53 Fed. Reg. 11,979 (1988) (implementing Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 503, 101 Stat.
468, 468-71 (1987)).
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lyzed for its chemical makeup,3 3 and the test results are returned to the
employer. If the results indicate the presence of drugs, the employer may
terminate the individual's employment, or reject the employment
application.34
B. Constitutional Challenges to Preemployment Drug Testing
Plaintiffs have challenged mandatory employee or applicant drug test-
ing under many legal theories.35 Only challenges asserting denial of due
process or unreasonable search and seizure, however, have proven
successful.36
1. Due Process
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 37 An individual could assert his constitutional rights to
property based on his status as a government employee,38 because em-
ployment with the government arguably may be considered property for
constitutional due process purposes.39 An employment applicant, how-
ever, has no basis upon which to assert a similar due process claim, be-
cause a property interest in employment only arises if the individual has a
33. For an in-depth discussion of the methods of analyzing urine specimens for the
presence of illegal drugs, see Rector, supra note 31.
34. The accuracy of the different methods of specimen analysis is widely disputed.
Ellen M. Alderman, Note, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 852, 854 (1986). An additional discussion of the accuracy of
specimen analysis is presented by the court in Amalgamated Transit Union v. City of
Oklahoma City, 710 F. Supp. 1321, 1324-25 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
35. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(challenging drug testing under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796 (1988)); National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 685 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. La.
1988) (also challenging the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (challenging drug
testing under a right to privacy); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(challenging the use of evidence obtained through the extraction of body fluids as violating
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). A good discussion of the pros and
cons of the above-mentioned challenges to drug testing appears in Lois Yurow, Note, Al-
ternative Challenges to Drug Testing of Government Employees: Options After Von Raab
and Skinner, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 148 (1989).
36. See Yurow, supra note 35, at 178.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. Yurow, supra note 35, at 150-53.
39. Id.
1994]
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legitimate claim of entitlement to employment. °
The Fifth Amendment's protection of an individual's liberty interest
may provide a sounder legal basis to challenge the denial of employment
based on a positive drug test.4 ' Courts have recognized a liberty interest
where an individual has been subject to government disciplinary action.42
To demonstrate that government disciplinary action deprives an individ-
ual of liberty without due process, an individual must satisfy a three-
prong test.43 First, the individual must show the government's discipli-
nary action raised serious questions about his or her integrity in a manner
that damaged his standing in the community or that foreclosed job oppor-
tunities.44 Second, this stigma must arise "in the course" of the discipli-
nary action.45 Finally, the person must demonstrate that public disclosure
of the drug test results is likely.46
This three-prong test was applied in Burka v. New York City Transit
Authority,47 where applicants for employment and others challenged a
mandatory drug testing program. 48 The applicants easily satisfied the
first two requirements. 49 However, the court questioned whether the ap-
plicants had demonstrated that disclosure of the drug test results to the
public was likely.5 ° The court analyzed the policies of individual employ-
ers to determine whether the employers disclosed the test results.5 1 The
40. Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 610 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
41. One commentator implies that applicants for government employment might
make a case "for relief in the form of procedural due process protection ... [if] they can
establish a liberty interest." Yurow, supra note 35, at 151-52.
42. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
43. Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
44. Id. (citing Brandt v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 820 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir.
1987)).
45. Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976)).
46. Id. (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976)).
47. 739 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
48. Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
49. Burka, 739 F. Supp. at 834.
50. Id.
51. Id. The district court, citing Brandt v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services,
820 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1987), recognized that although the employer in Burka had a policy
against the release of test results, public disclosure of the information could still occur.
Burka, 739 F. Supp. at 834. Such a situation would likely arise where a subsequent em-
ployer asked an applicant to truthfully explain any terminations or suspensions from prior
employment. Id. Rather than endorsing a policy that promoted telling untruths, the court
accepted that "[t]he necessity of revealing the stigmatizing contents of one's ... files on
future job applications . .. . satisfies the likelihood of public disclosure condition." Id.
Therefore, the court concluded that an individual's liberty interests are affected by submis-
sion to mandatory drug testing. Id.
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court concluded that in cases where the employer's policy was not to in-
form the applicant of the reasons for denying employment, there was no
likelihood of public disclosure of the test results.5 2 The court further con-
cluded that even if employment was denied because of a positive drug
test, the public would be unable to infer the reason behind the denial.53
Thus, under the Burka court's analysis, the applicant's liberty interest is
unaffected unless the employer discloses its reasons for rejecting the em-
ployment application, and the Fifth Amendment offers minimal grounds
for an applicant to challenge a testing program on the theory of depriva-
tion of liberty without due process.
2. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The second constitutional basis for challenges to preemployment drug
testing by a government agency is unreasonable search and seizure. The
Fourth Amendment states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure...
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."54 The
purpose of the amendment is to protect individuals from arbitrary inva-
sions of privacy by government officials." This protection extends to
both government employees56 and employees of government-regulated
industries.57 Prior to two 1989 Supreme Court decisions, the reasonable-
ness of drug testing programs under the Fourth Amendment was uncer-
tain. Unfortunately, unanswered questions remain despite Supreme
Court guidance on the issue.
a. Guidance from the Supreme Court: Skinner and Von Raab
Two Supreme Court cases, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab58 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,59 provide the con-
trolling authority on Fourth Amendment challenges to drug testing. The
Skinner and Von Raab majority opinions, both authored by Justice Ken-
52. Id. The employer's "policy is to refrain from even informing applicants.., of the
specific reasons for their dismissal. Rejected applicants ... would be unable even to ex-
plain the grounds for their rejections and thus would not be required to lie or to dissemble
about those grounds." Id.
53. Id. at 834-35 n.12.
54. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961).
55. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); see also Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
56. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
57. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
58. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
59. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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nedy, concluded that drug testing programs implemented by the govern-
ment or pursuant to government regulation are "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' The Court based both holdings on
the same legal theory. The principal difference between the cases was the
type of drug testing program involved. The Skinner Court dealt with the
government's ability to mandate drug testing programs in government-
regulated industries,6 ' and the Von Raab Court addressed the govern-
ment's ability to require a drug testing program for its own employees. 62
The Skinner Court recognized that testing for drugs involves several
levels of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. 63 The
Court first identified the searches, and then proceeded to the substantive
issue of their reasonableness. Guided by the principle that only unrea-
sonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment,
Justice Kennedy concluded that reasonableness is to be determined by an
analysis of all the circumstances surrounding the search and seizure. 61
The Court reached a final determination of reasonableness by weighing
the level of governmental intrusion against the legitimate interests as-
serted by the government for the intrusive policy. 65
There are several common standards that generally satisfy the reasona-
bleness requirement under Fourth Amendment analysis. They include:
the acquisition of a warrant, individualized suspicion, and probable
cause.66 Application of these standards to satisfy the reasonableness re-
quirement for drug testing in the workplace, however, is difficult and im-
60. Id. at 617; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
61. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
62. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
63. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
The initial detention necessary to procure the evidence may be a seizure of the
person ... if the detention amounts to a meaningful interference with his freedom
of movement .... Obtaining and examining the evidence may also be a search
... if doing so infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable ....
Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 619 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537
(1985)).
65. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). Furthermore, "[tihe pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment are graduated in proportion to the privacy interests
affected. Decreasing levels of intrusiveness require decreasing levels of justification."
Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Willner v. Barr, 112 S.
Ct. 669 (1991).
66. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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practical. 67 Recognizing this problem, the Supreme Court adopted an
exception to the stricter reasonableness standard traditionally applied in
other difficult situations.68 The Court injected a governmental "special
need" into the equation used to determine the reasonableness of a
search.69
The Skinner Court concluded that the government had a special inter-
est in protecting the safety of both the general public and individuals
dealing with the railroad industry.70 The Court maintained that prohibit-
ing employees in the industry "from using alcohol or drugs on duty, or
while subject to being called for duty," furthers that special interest.7 ' In
Von Raab, the "special need" of the government factor tipped the scales
decidedly in favor of the government.72 The Von Raab Court concluded
that the government possessed special and compelling interests in main-
taining the integrity of government personnel involved in drug interdic-
tion and in ensuring the public safety against government employees
carrying firearms. 73 Accordingly, the Von Raab Court concluded that
testing those "employees who seek to be promoted to positions that di-
rectly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incum-
bent to carry a firearm" was reasonable.74
Under the Skinner and Von Raab decisions, drug testing for employ-
ment purposes does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure if the government can establish a
special need that outweighs the individual's privacy interests. This special
need must arise in the context of public safety protection or in the context
of direct interdiction of illegal drugs.
b. Application of Skinner and Von Raab to Preemployment Drug
Testing
Plaintiffs and defendants alike have relied on the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in the Skinner and Von Raab opinions in challenges to drug testing
at all levels. Courts have generally required the presence of a public
safety concern to find a preemployment drug testing program reasonable
67. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20.
68. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 621.
72. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
73. Id. at 677.
74. Id.
1994]
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under the Fourth Amendment; 75 a mere application for employment is
not enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard. 6 However, courts
have concluded that individuals' status as applicants lessens their privacy
rights,7 and under the Skinner and Von Raab tests, the government's
burden in defending an employment applicant's challenge to a drug test-
ing program is a minimal one.7
Willner v. Thornburgh79 presents an excellent example of the reduced
right to privacy for job applicants. In this case, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia considered an applicant's ability to
challenge mandatory preemployment drug testing by the Department of
Justice.' Considering whether the testing was an unreasonable search
and seizure, the court determined that the government was not required
to show as great a need for the testing to successfully outweigh an appli-
cant's privacy interests, as it was required to show to justify employee
testing.8 ' The court initially concluded that the drug test was a minimal
intrusion on the applicant's privacy. 2 The court then added several new
factors to the equation. First, the court noted that the applicant was
aware of the impending drug test prior to his application. 3 Second, the
court reasoned that if the applicant was not willing to have his privacy
75. See Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (N.D. Ga. 1990)
(striking down as unconstitutional a Georgia law that required all applicants for state em-
ployment to submit to and pass a, drug test). The court expressly stated, however, that
absent the statute, the state could still test any applicants who sought positions for which
testing is permissible under the Skinner and Von Raab tests. Id.; see also International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of RTansp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1307 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Department of Transportation had a sufficient interest in protecting public safety
on the highways to require preemployment controlled substance testing of truck drivers).
76. Several federal jurisdictions have held that a mere interest in the integrity of the
workforce is not a sufficient basis to require an individual to submit to drug testing. See,
e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Georgia Ass'n of Educa-
tors, 749 F. Supp. at 1115.
77. See, e.g., Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648,
654-55 (D.D.C. 1989).
78. See Yurow, supra note 35, at 148-49.
79. 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Willner v. Barr, 112 S. Ct. 669 (1991).
80. Willner, 928 F.2d at 1186.
81. Id. at 1188. The court reasoned:
Decreasing levels of intrusiveness require decreasing levels of justification. If the
reasonable privacy expectations of applicants are less than those of employees
and if the testing procedure for applicants is itself unintrusive, the government is
not required to demonstrate as high a degree of justification as it must to conduct
random testing of those already employed.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1190.
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invaded by the drug test, he simply could have withdrawn his employ-
ment application.' Third, the court concluded that given the application
requirements, applicants could not "reasonably expect to... shield their
private lives from government scrutiny during the hiring process."85 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that because drug testing of job applicants had
been a common practice in the private sector for a considerable amount
of time,' the public generally expects drug testing to accompany applica-
tions for employment.87
Although the lower standard of protection for privacy interests of job
applicants is a recent development, it could be extended to other areas of
preemployment drug testing. The consequences would likely mean that
the current standards for employee testing set forth in Skinner and Von
Raab, which are already easy for the government to meet, would no
longer be necessary in the context of applicants for employment. Future
development of this area of the law will make it increasingly difficult for
an applicant to prevail on a claim of unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment in the context of drug testing.
III. AVAILABLE REMEDIES
Although it has become increasingly difficult for an individual to chal-
lenge preemployment drug testing, an applicant still might prevail under
one of the constitutional theories. Assuming an individual prevails, the
question arises as to the remedy for the constitutional violation. The fol-
lowing section addresses remedies that may or may not be available.
84. Id. The Willner court quoted Judge Friendly, who stated that "there is a human
difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants." Id. (quoting
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975)).
85. Willner, 928 F.2d at 1191. The court was alluding to questions posed on the job
application form as well as to a required background check of applicants. The court stated:
By divulging... whether he uses, or has used within the past five years, mari-
juana, cocaine, narcotics, hallucinogenics, or other dangerous or illegal drugs, and
by consenting to an F.B.I. investigation in which his friends, neighbors, relatives
and past and present business associates may be asked if he uses drugs, an appli-
cant relinquishes whatever privacy he might otherwise retain with respect to such
information, even When the information is derived from chemical analysis.
Id. at 1189.
86. "Some of the nation's largest employers, including American Telephone & Tele-
graph, DuPont, Exxon, Federal Express, rans World Airlines, and United Airlines, have
drug-testing programs for job applicants." Id. at 1191-92.
87. Id. at 1192. "Nonetheless, what is occurring generally outside government is some
indication of what expectations of privacy 'society is prepared to accept as "reasonable"'
when the government engages in the hiring process.", Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
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A. The Remedy Under a Theory of Due Process
Little substantive relief is available to the applicant prevailing on a due
process claim. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
an individual is entitled to some form of hearing prior to deprivation of a
liberty or property interest.88 In the context of a challenge to preemploy-
ment drug testing, the only remedy available is the imposition of proce-
dural safeguards to give the applicant notice of the testing program.8 9
Thus, even if an applicant proves his rights were violated, the employer
can remedy the situation by giving the applicant adequate notice of the
testing, and by allowing the applicant the opportunity to withdraw his
application to avoid injury.9 Therefore, the remedy available for a due
process challenge would not be effective to prevent further preemploy-
ment drug testing.
B. Remedies Available Under a Theory of Unreasonable Search and
Seizure
More opportunities for relief are available to an applicant or applicants
challenging a preemployment drug testing program as an unreasonable
search and seizure, because relief is available both at law and in equity.
However, an analysis of the various Fourth Amendment remedies indi-
cates that most provide little substantive relief. Indeed, of all the reme-
dies available, only an injunction can effectively protect the Fourth
Amendment rights of an applicant.
1. Remedy at Law: Compensation
In general, compensation as a remedy at law is not available for unlaw-
ful search and seizure. When property is seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the normal remedy is exclusion of the evidence in a subse-
quent decision-making proceeding, such as a trial.9 ' Only in the rare in-
stances where the seizure directly causes the harm will a court grant
88. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
89. Yurow, supra note 35, at 154. "For a job applicant, the issue is whether the appli-
cant is fully aware before pursuing a position that drug testing may be required, and that a
positive result will prompt adverse consequences." Id. Yurow suggests providing notice to
an applicant by placing a warning on the job application "that urinalysis drug testing is a
pre-condition of employment." Id. (citing Dozier v. New York City, 519 N.Y.S.2d 135, 143
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
90. Id. at 154-55.
91. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-56 (1961).
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compensatory relief. 2 At least one court has addressed the issue. In
Burka v. New York City Transit Authority,93 the plaintiff requested mone-
tary damages as a remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation.94 The
court stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to deter future
unlawful government conduct. '95 The court reasoned that in instances
where future unlawful conduct would not be deterred by the exclusion of
tainted evidence, however, the evidence should be admitted.96 The court
concluded that because the consideration of drug test results by potential
employers did not directly harm the plaintiffs,97 they were not entitled to
compensatory relief.98 The only remedy the Burka court allowed was in-
junctive relief.99
2. Equitable Remedies
Where monetary relief for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is un-
available, a plaintiff can seek equitable relief, but the only practical rem-
edy a court can provide for the injuries caused by a preemployment
testing program is to declare the program unconstitutional and enjoin its
further implementation. °°
a. Declaratory Relief
Courts have granted declaratory relief to remedy Fourth Amendment
violations caused by drug testing programs. Declaratory judgments
alone, however, provide little actual protection against unreasonable
92. In surveying the case law on the subject, one court noted that "[clompensation for
an unlawful search cannot be obtained unless the constitutional violation caused the harm
suffered." Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 747 F. Supp. 214, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978)). See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386 (1989) (awarding compensation for use of excessive force); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (awarding compensation for emotional harm).
93. 747 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
94. Burka, 747 F. Supp. at 218.
95. Id. at 219 (citing James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 651 (1990)).
96. Id. (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)).
97. Id. at 219.
98. Id. at 220. The Burka court stated that the Due Process Clause provides compen-
sation as a remedy for parties injured by government action. Id. at 219. It is clear, how-
ever, that in the context of drug testing and a potential deprivation of liberty by the
government, remedies available to job applicants extend only to the provision of notice by
the employer. The court further reasoned that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
work-related disciplinary proceedings in dismissing the plaintiff's plea for compensation.
Id. at 220.
99. See id.
100. See id.
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searches and seizures. For example, in Georgia Ass'n of Educators v.
Harris,10 1 the court concluded that the state's interest in maintaining a
drug-free workplace alone was insufficient to outweigh the applicant's
privacy interest under the Von Raab test."° The court held that the stat-
ute mandating drug testing for all state employment applicants was un-
constitutional because it was overinclusive.10 3 The court stated that
mandatory testing was only permissible for employment positions for
which the state's interests were sufficient to outweigh those of the indi-
vidual."° Declaratory relief alone, however, did not remedy the appli-
cant's interest in avoiding intrusive drug testing. Although it gave the
state legislature guidance as to how to design a permissible testing pro-
gram,105 declaratory relief provides limited help for other job applicants,
who may still have to bring suit to establish that their individual rights
were violated.
Another example of the inadequate protection of declaratory judg-
ments alone against Fourth Amendment violations is Burka v. New York
City Transit Authority." 6 In this case, the court sought to remedy a
Fourth Amendment violation by declaring that the information obtained
through an unconstitutional testing program be expunged from the em-
ployees' work records in order to protect their privacy interests.1°7 The
court concluded that the employees were entitled to have the drug testing
information expunged from their records, but they were not entitled to
have employment decisions overturned because the use of drug testing
information in the decision-making process did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.10 8
The practical effect of this unique remedy is unclear from the opin-
101. 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
102. Harris, 749 F. Supp. at 1114-15. The court stated:
[D]efendants [are not relieved] of their obligation to articulate a substantial gov-
ernmental interest served by testing all job applicants. Because defendants have
failed to articulate such an interest, their side of the balancing scale is empty, and
even if plaintiffs' fourth amendment interests are "lighter" than those of existing
employees, they are undoubtedly "heavy" enough to prevail here.
Id. at 1114 n.5.
103. Id. at 1115-16.
104. Id. at 1116. "[T]he court is not forbidding defendants [the state] from drug testing
those job applicants whom they are constitutionally permitted to test. Rather, the court is
only saying that defendants may not conduct those tests pursuant to the [state law]." Id.
105. See id.
106. 747 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
107. Burka, 747 F. Supp. at 220.
108. Id.
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ion." 9 Apparently, the court ordered the employee records expunged to
prevent future employers from using the drug test results in employment
decisions.11 However, the court did not reverse past employment deci-
sions based on the improperly obtained information. As a result, the par-
ties could not obtain relief in the form of reinstatement or
reconsideration of job applications.
b. Injunctive Relief
The aforementioned remedies afford little substantive relief to preem-
ployment applicants who successfully challenge drug testing programs.
To provide effective substantive relief to these plaintiffs, a court must
stop the testing or prohibit employers from using the test results in hiring
decisions. One effective, but inefficient means for a court to provide such
relief is to declare the program's statutory basis unconstitutional."' A
more efficient way for a court to stop the constitutionally offensive test-
ing is for a court to enjoin continued testing. However, courts generally
avoid enjoining an entire program if possible, and determine the constitu-
tionality of a drug testing program on an employment position-by-posi-
tion basis.
An example of a court's use of injunctive relief is- found in Burka v.
New York City Transit Authority."2 The Burka court balanced the pri-
vacy interests of the individuals against the safety interests of the em-
ployer 1 3 and concluded that drug testing for employees in certain
positions was unreasonable." 4 The, court enjoined testing for those posi-
tions, but it refused to enjoin the entire program1 5 because it saw no
109. See id.
110. See Burka v. New York Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ana-
lyzing how drug test results could be used by future employers or potential employers).
111. See Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
112. Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 747 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (opinion
and order granting remedy in bifurcated trial).
113. See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(opinion and order resolving liability issue in bifurcated trial).
114. See id. The court decided the constitutionality of testing applicants and current
workers in the following positions: subway booth attendants and station cleaners-testing
held constitutional; turnstile maintainers and stock handlers-testing held unconstitu-
tional; employees in the car equipment department, including painters and cleaners-test-
ing held unconstitutional; car repair supervisors-testing held constitutional; most
employees in the track maintenance division-testing held constitutional (excepting the
power distribution maintainers). Id. at 821-23. The list describes other positions and the
constitutionality of "suspicionless" drug testing based on the safety-sensitive nature of the
jobs involved. Id. at 823-26.
115. See id.
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reason why the agency would not comply with the court's order.'1 6 The
court further reasoned that enjoining the whole program would be tanta-
mount to creating operating procedures for the agency, which the court
considered imprudent. 17
The use of equitable relief by courts indicates that it is unconstitutional
to implement a program mandating drug testing for all employment ap-
plicants if the reasons for doing so do not outweigh the privacy interests
of the individuals tested. Because legislatures can enact new statutes that
comply with constitutional requirements, the injunction is the only practi-
cal remedy available to a job applicant with a successful constitutional
challenge to a testing program. However, an analysis of an applicant's
ability to seek injunctive relief in light of the holding in American Postal
Workers Union v. Frank illustrates the difficulty involved in remedying
such a constitutional violation.
c. The Injunction as Affected by American Postal Workers Union
v. Frank
An analysis of the cases where an individual applicant or group of ap-
plicants was permitted to challenge a mandatory preemployment drug
testing program illustrates a judicial trend of deciding constitutionality on
an individual basis rather than a group basis. The decision in Frank fur-
thers this trend.
There are two contexts in which preemployment testing has been chal-
lenged by a group of individuals. First, groups have challenged
mandatory preemployment drug testing in class action suits.1 18 Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a group of individuals must be certi-
fied by the court as a class before they can bring a class action suit in that
capacity. 9 Although certification is a lengthy and difficult process, 2 °
courts have certified classes of applicants for agency employment.121
Once certified, courts have granted the class standing to challenge preem-
ployment drug testing and to seek an injunction.122 However, even in
class action suits, courts remain unwilling to enjoin an entire agency test-
116. Burka, 747 F. Supp. at 225.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 121 F.R.D. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
120. See id.
121. Burka, 121 F.R.D. at 216.
122. See, e.g., id.
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ing program, as evident in Burka.123
The second manner in which groups have sought to enjoin a drug test-
ing program is through suits brought by organizations such as labor un-
ions. 24 Courts have allowed a labor union to challenge drug testing
programs under the doctrine of associational standing.125 Labor unions
tend to avoid challenging preemployment testing because of standing
problems. 126 Labor unions have challenged preemployment testing when
their members were applying for jobs that required drug testing.127
Although organizations are subject to the same substantive requirements
set forth in Skinner and Von Raab, courts permit them to seek an injunc-
tion in their prayer for relief.128
In Frank, the First Circuit denied the Union associational standing
based on the type of relief sought. 29 The court reasoned that an injunc-
tion is permissible only to stop the threat of future harm caused by an
unconstitutional search and seizure,'130 and absent a reasonable threat of
future harm, a party has no standing to seek injunctive relief.13  The
Union's members were employees of the USPS by definition. 32 How-
ever, the court concluded that current applicants were only potential
members, 133 and therefore no current member of the Union reasonably
faced the threat of future injury from a preemployment drug test.3 Be-
123. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., National 'Teasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991).
125. For a superb analysis of the requirements of associational standing pertaining to a
union's challenge of an employer's drug testing policy, see American Postal Workers
Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1375-78 (1st Cir. 1992).
126. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (suit to enjoin plan for suspicionless testing of employees); Amalgamated Transit
Union v. City of Okla. City, 710 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (suit to enjoin testing
program of employees which also called for preemployment testing); Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Cambria County Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (union challeng-
ing post-employment testing only); Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Washing-
ton, 672 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1987) (union challenging postemployment testing only).
127. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292
(9th Cir. 1991); Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648
(D.D.C. 1989); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
128. See, e.g., supra notes 126-27.
129. Frank, 968 F.2d at 1376-77.
130. Id. at 1376.
131. Id.; Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992).
132. Frank, 968 F.2d at 1377.
133. Id. at 1374.
134. Id. at 1377.
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cause the Union did not represent someone who could be redressed by an
injunction, the court concluded that the Union lacked standing to seek an
injunction.1 35
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION V. FRANK
The Frank holding principally affects the ability of a group of individu-
als to challenge a drug testing program applied to all persons seeking
employment with a government agency or in a field regulated by the gov-
ernment. Before applicants are given the opportunity to make out a case
under the Skinner and Von Raab tests, they must meet one of two lengthy
and arduous procedures to perfect a challenge. Applicants must either
seek to certify themselves as a class or bring individual lawsuits to deter-
mine the safety sensitivity of each position of employment. The latter
route is inefficient and unnecessarily burdensome in terms of time and
financial resources.
There are also problems associated with the policy of compelling multi-
ple individual challenges to drug testing programs. Only allowing an as-
sociation to seek to enjoin preemployment drug testing on behalf of its
member-applicants and denying the same relief to applicants who do not
have an organization to represent their interests is inherently unfair. Ar-
ticle III standing requirements should not be used to promote an inequi-
table policy in which standing is granted to some and denied to others
when the interests in jeopardy are the same for all. Such a policy should
be reassessed to create a more equitable result.
V. CONCLUSION
The holding in American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, which denied
standing to a labor union seeking to enjoin a mandatory preemployment
drug testing program for all USPS job applicants, furthers a policy that
requires individuals to bring constitutional challenges to drug testing pro-
grams. Although in accordance with the current law of standing, the
holding in Frank is both inefficient and inequitable. Although American
Postal Workers Union v. Frank will not be the last challenge to drug test-
ing programs, it has set a precedent that, if followed, will further under-
135. Id. at 1375. The court concluded that the Union had standing to seek relief in the
form of damages because it represented individuals who had been subjected to the tests.
Id. at 1376. However, it is fairly clear that relief for injury to one's freedom from unrea-
sonable search and seizure cannot be adequately had in the form of damages. See supra
notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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mine an individual's ability to assert his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court in the Skinner and Von Raab decisions
tried to provide guidance to protect the rights of citizens in the context of
drug testing programs. Unfortunately, decisions like the First Circuit's in
American Postal Workers Union v. Frank illustrate fundamental flaws in
the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis. It would be in the best inter-
ests of all parties involved if the Supreme Court were to provide a more
efficient means by which job applicants can seek the constitutional pro-
tection to which they are entitled.

